I. Introduction
The performance characteristics of an industry are closely linked to the nature of entry and exit in the industry. If entry barriers are low, the threat of potential entry can effectively constrain the ability of incumbent firms to raise price above the competitive level. On the other hand, as entry barriers rise and the probability of entry diminishes, the potential for monopolistic practices increases. Prior empirical studies of entry have focused mainly on its determinants, emphasizing industry characteristics as entry barriers. Examples include McGuckin [19] , Orr [21] , McDonald [17] , and Duetsch [7] , which analyze the number of new entrants, and Berry [4] Second, we provide a methodological improvement over the logarithmic regression approaches of Orr and Duestch. Because the observations on entry are count data (non-negative integers), our model is developed from the premise that entry requires a statistical framework based on a discrete probability distribution. To meet this requirement, we specify and estimate an econometric model of entry based on the Poisson distribution. Our methodology is in the spirit of Hausman, Hall, and Griliches [11] who apply the Poisson distribution to count data on patent application across firms. Hausman, Hall and Griliches point out that the Poisson model offers an improved methodology for a wide range of economic applications that feature data in the form of repeated counts. This observation motivated our application of the Poisson distribution to the entry problem. The Poisson approach admits a richer analysis of the entry data than the logarithmic regression approach in two ways. First, the logarithmic specification, while computationally convenient, provides a rather incomplete description of the entry data. The log of entry is only well defined 1. Other applications of the Poisson distribution to economic data can be found in Cameron and Triveda [5] , and Mullahy [20] .
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for those industries showing positive entry; it is undefined for industries in which entry is absent. The flaw, of course, is that "zero entry" industries, which are not captured in the specification, are also important to the study of entry behavior. It is these industries that reveal the configurations of profits and other industry characteristics that preclude entry. If observations on the "zero entry" industries are deleted from the sample to facilitate the estimation, as is sometimes done in practice, then relevant information is lost. For the Poisson approach, in contrast, both types of observations (positive and zero entry) are natural outcomes of the specification; the Poisson approach incorporates all relevant information in a logically consistent manner.
The second limitation of the log specification, which is overcome by the Poisson, is that maximum likelihood estimation is precluded. Obviously, the error term for a logarithmic regression equation with a discrete dependent variable (the log of entry) cannot be normally distributed, which is required for the OLS estimates to coincide with the ML estimates. More generally, ML estimation is precluded for this specification because it is unclear what distributional assumptions are appropriate. In contrast, for the Poisson approach, which specifies the distribution of entry, ML estimation along with its well known desirable properties is readily available. 2 With the distribution of entry specified as Poisson we are also able to estimate the probabilities of entry across industries, and thus direct the study towards limit pricing in a new and interesting way. Indeed, the probability of entry has become a central feature of recent limit pricing models. In the classic static limit pricing model of Bain [2] , dominant firms can either engage in limit pricing and deter all entry or they can set a short-run profit maximizing price that results in unimpeded entry. Entry barriers determine the optimal strategy; with high barriers, the price decrease needed to deter entry is likely to be small enough to make limit-pricing a viable alternative. The probability of entry is crucial to the recent extensions of Bain's work to a dynamic setting by Kamien and Schartz [13] , Gaskins [9] , Baron [3] , and Flaherty [8] . In these models, firms face a continuum of pricing strategies linked to the probability of entry: as the price rises above that which completely blocks entry, the probability of entry gradually rises. In sum, dynamic limit-pricing models predict that pricing decisions across different market structures vary with the probability of entry across markets. Consequently, estimates of these probabilities are of interest for limit pricing.
Section II presents a general specification of entry based on the work of Orr [21] and Duetsch [7] , and describes the Poisson estimation approach in more detail. Section III describes the data on the 330 four-digit SIC industries to be analyzed. Section IV presents the ML estimates of the Poisson model, and OLS estimates of log and linear entry models. These estimates are compared with each other and with those found in the literature. Finally, we present estimates of the probability of entry across industries.
II. A Poisson Model of Entry
The first task is to identify the relevant entry-variables. Our selection of variables was guided primarily by arguments given in Orr [21] and Duetsch [7] which we briefly summarize here. Ei denotes the number of new entrants in the ith industry; PRi is a profit index; GRi is industry growth; VSi is the value of shipments in the industry; Ki is the capital requirement per plant; ASRi is the advertising-sales ratio; CRi is the industry concentration ratio; SCALi measures economies of scale; and MULTi is an index of multiplant activity. Orr [21] and Duetsch [7] base their estimations on logarithmic regression versions of the specification. The difficulty with this approach is that entry, Ei, is an integer-valued count variable with a range that includes Ei = 0 (no entry). Thus, the problem arises of how to handle log(Ei) for Ei = 0. If one wishes to retain the logarithmic specification there are two options, neither of which is completely satisfactory. The first option is to exclude the "zeroes" from the sample. However, a smaller and less informative sample means less efficient estimates. Alternatively, one can "solve" the zero value problem by adopting an ad hoc procedure such as setting the zeroes to one and adding a dummy variable to the equation as is done in Pakes and Griliches [22] . Estimates of the asymptotic variances of the ML estimates, which are needed to compute tstatistics, are obtained from the negative inverse of this matrix evaluated at P.
As discussed in the introduction, the probability of entry is of interest to contemporary limit pricing theory. Once 13 is obtained, estimates of these probabilities across industries can be easily generated from firms. Ideally, one should measure E directly with data on gross entry; unfortunately, such data are unavailable.
Following Duetsch [7] , the profit indices, PR, are the residuals from regressing industry price-cost margins on capital-sales ratios and advertising-sales ratios. The reason for the adjustment is to obtain a measure of profitability more closely associated with the entry incentive. As Duetsch [7, 481] points out, high price-cost margins due to high advertising and capital intensity will be largely discounted by potential entrants.
For an index of scale economies in an industry, SCAL, we use the productivity per worker of large firms relative to the productivity per worker of small firms. A similar index has been used by Allen [1] , and Chappel and Cottle [6] . Descriptions of the remaining variables are left to Table I . Table II. A comparison of the three columns of Table II Of the entry determinants in Table II , the estimates of the Orr and Duetsch studies agree on only market size, In VS, and plant capital requirement, lnK.4 The Poisson estimates also agree with these findings. Market size is positively and significantly related to entry, while the effect of plant capital requirements is negative and significant. The Orr-Duetsch estimates conflict for productivity differential between small and large firms. If there is a large difference between the productivity per worker of large and small firms, and hence a large value for SCAL, there are two possible effects on entry. To the extent that entering firms must compete with large, efficient firms, there is a negative effect on entry. This is the traditional interpretation. However, if there is a relatively inefficient fringe that entering firms are going to compete against, entry will be stimulated rather than suppressed. Our results suggest that when there is a significant cost difference among firms in an industry, there is a net positive effect on entry.
IV. Empirical Results

For comparison purposes
Next we consider the issue of limit pricing which was not addressed in the Orr-Duetsch studies. Limit pricing models are predicated on the assumption that dominant firms base their pricing decisions on the probability of entry. These models demonstrate that small probabilities of entry are suggestive of limit pricing. As mentioned earlier, an advantage of the Poisson model is that estimates of the probabilities of entry across industries can be computed from it. The estimated probabilities of entry are reported in Table III . Five market structures were created based on industry concentration levels. Actual and predicted entry (based on estimates of /i) are also reported for each concentration group.
In the lowest concentration group (four-firm concentration less than or equal to 20 percent) the estimated probability of more than 10 and 50 firms entering is .99 and .83 respectively. This result is as expected: there is little basis for believing that limit pricing can occur in low concen-tration industries. Similarly, the estimated probabilities of significant entry (more than 10 firms) are large for the next two groups: 21-30 percent and 31-50 percent concentration.
When concentration is greater than 50 percent, the results are more suggestive of limit pricing. In the 51-70 percent group, the estimated probability of entry by more than five firms is .66, drops to .49 for more than 10 firms entering, and is only .12 for more than 50 firms entering. The results for the highest concentration category (greater than 71 percent) indicate conditions amenable to limit pricing by dominant firms: the estimated probability of more than one firm entering is only .57 and the estimate dramatically drops to .21 for more than five firms entering.
V. Concluding Remarks
We have presented maximum likelihood estimates of an entry model based on the Poisson distribution. This methodology reflects the discrete nature of the dependent variable. The sample analyzed was for a more recent time period, and included considerably more industries than prior studies. The estimates generally conform to a priori expectations. We found profitability, growth, market size, and intra-firm efficiency differentials to be positively related to entry. Four indices of entry barriers were found to have a significant, negative impact: capital requirements, advertising, concentration, and multi-plant production. These results are especially important given the conflicting results of prior studies, most notably, those of Orr and Duetsch. Moreover, we presented the first estimates of the probability of entry across various market structures; a concept that is fundamental to contemporary limit pricing models.
